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In re Edwin L.: When process isn't due
"Herein lies the peculiar paradox of juvenile courts: designed to
ensure a superior justice through protection of the child, they
have to an excessive extent abandoned the fundamentals upon
which the methods of promoting justice are based."'
"Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by
methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of
law."2
I. Introduction
Almost three decades ago, in the landmark decision In re
Gault,3 the United States Supreme Court declared that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."4 For the first time, our highest Court specifically held
that in a proceeding in which a child is facing the "tremendous
consequence" of being adjudged a "delinquent" and. conse-
quently may be deprived of his freedom,5 the juvenile is entitled
to many of the same procedural due process protections guaran-
teed to criminal defendants. 6 It is particularly significant to the
issue addressed in this Note, however, that the scope of the
Supreme Court's ruling is expressly limited to the adjudicatory
phase of the juvenile justice process; that is, the phase in which
it is determined whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a re-
sult of alleged misconduct on his part.7 The Supreme Court in
Gault was not confronted with the application of procedural due
process during the pre-judicial or post-adjudicatory stages of
the juvenile justice process.8 Hence, under Gault the states re-
mained substantially free to determine what, if any, procedural
1. PAUL W. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 170 (Richard T. La Piere consult-
ing ed., 1949).
2. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (plurality opinion).
3. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. See id. at 13.
5. See id. at 56-57 (in part quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554
(1966)).
6. See Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
7. See id. at 13.
8. See id.
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due process guarantees must be afforded by Family Courts dur-
ing non-adjudicatory juvenile delinquency proceedings. 9
Accordingly, a deeply divided New York Court of Appeals
recently held 10 that Family Court judges need afford a child ac-
cused of violating a condition of a non-adjudicatory adjourn-
ment in contemplation of dismissal (hereinafter "ACD")" only
minimal procedural due process protections prior to revocation
of the child's conditional freedom. 12
Despite a fervent dissent,' 3 the majority maintained that
an ACD order is not a "dispositional" order, and thus, its revoca-
tion does not entitle the juvenile to the same procedural protec-
tions constitutionally required prior to dispositional
revocations.' 4 Noting that the juvenile has not yet been ad-
judged a "delinquent," the majority concluded that the juvenile
possesses only an "attenuated," rather than a "vested," liberty
interest in a court-ordered ACD.' 5 Balancing this limited lib-
erty interest against the significant state interests involved, the
majority held that the concept of due process is satisfied as long
as the Family Court conducts some sort of inquiry into, and af-
9. See id.
10. In re Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1996).
11. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 315.3(1) (McKinney 1983) states in pertinent part:
An adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (hereinafter "ACD") is an ad-
journment of the proceeding, for a period not to exceed six months, with a
view to ultimate dismissal of the petition in furtherance ofjustice.... If the
proceeding is not restored, the petition is, at the expiration of the order,
deemed to have been dismissed by the court in furtherance of justice.
A juvenile ACD allows, in the court's discretion, certain juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings to be conditionally postponed pending final adjudication; upon fulfillment
of court-specified conditions, the adjourned charges are effectively dismissed. See
id. An ACD may be contingent upon "such terms and conditions as the court
deems appropriate." Id. The juvenile ACD process is "non-adjudicatory" because it
does not contribute to the determination of whether a child is in fact a "delinquent"
as a result of alleged misconduct on his part. See id. On the contrary, the ACD
process merely postpones that determination pending possible dismissal. See id.
12. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597, 603, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 1251, 648
N.Y.S.2d at 851, 854.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 210-228; see Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at
617, 671 N.E.2d at 1260, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 856 (Levine, Titone, Ciparick, JJ.,
dissenting).
14. See id. at 600-01, 671 N.E.2d at 1250, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 853; see generally
supra note 11 and accompanying text, infra notes 172-73.
15. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 601-03, 671 N.E.2d at 1250-51, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 853-54 (pointing out that vacatur of an ACD "merely brings the juvenile back to
the same circumstances he would have faced after the conclusion of fact-finding").
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fords the juvenile an opportunity to respond to the allegations
against him.16 In addition, the Family Court must find that
there is a "legitimate basis" for revoking the ACD.17
The dissent, on the other hand, maintained that the condi-
tional liberty interest implicated by an ACD is "essentially iden-
tical" to that afforded by the dispositions of parole and
probation.18 Characterizing this liberty interest as "signifi-
cant," the dissent argued that the absence of a formal adjudica-
tion of guilt was constitutionally irrelevant.' 9 Thus, the
dissenters concluded that the majority's relaxed "legitimate ba-
sis" test was constitutionally insufficient to protect a juvenile's
right not to have his ACD revoked without due process of law. 20
The case that so divided the New York Court of Appeals is
In re Edwin L.21 Beneath the surface of the conflicting Edwin
L. opinions are two interesting questions. First, what, if any,
constitutionally protected interest does a juvenile have in a
post-fact-finding ACD order?22 Second, irrespective of a consti-
tutionally protected interest, might the underlying goals of the
Family Court justify diminished due process in juvenile ACD
revocation proceedings?
To preface the discussion of these issues, Part II of this
Note will begin with an outline of the historical treatment of
juvenile crime. Part III of this Note will then address the appli-
cable due process inquiry. Part IV will provide a summary of
the significant elements of Edwin L., while Part V will analyze
16. See id.
17. See id. at 603-04, 671 N.E.2d at 1251-52, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 854-55.
18. See id. at 607, 613, 671 N.E.2d at 1253, 1257-58, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 856, 860-
61 (Levine, J., dissenting).
19. See id. at 613-15, 671 N.E.2d at 1257-59, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 860-62.
20. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 613-15, 671 N.E.2d at 1257-59, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 860-62.
21. 88 N.Y.2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1996).
22. An ACD may be granted "at any time prior" to a formal determination of
juvenile delinquency. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 315.3(1), 352.1 (McKinney 1983).
Thus, a court may, in its discretion, decide to grant a conditional adjournment
even before it conclusively ascertains the juvenile's guilt or innocence. See § 315.3.
On the other hand, the court may find it advisable to conclude the fact-finding
process before it decides to adjourn the proceedings in contemplation of dismissal.
Accordingly, a "post-fact-finding ACD order" is one that is granted after a hearing
has been held to adjudicate the factual question of guilt (but, as required by the
statute, prior to the formal order of delinquency). See § 315.3(1); see generally in-
fra notes 172-73.
[Vol. 18:85
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the above questions and their implications with reference to Ed-
win's case. In Part VI, the author will ultimately conclude that
the majority analysis is flawed, and the resultant procedural
standards are constitutionally lacking.
II. Historical Treatment of Juvenile Crime
A. Basic Pre-Gault Overview
The juvenile justice system is based on the concept of parens pa-
triae or, by implication, the rehabilitative ideal. Because of this
orientation, . . . the courts have traditionally developed proce-
dures for handling juvenile law violations that differ from those
used for adults .... However, these differences [in procedural
standards] should be based on sound legal, social and constitu-
tional principles, and the objective should be to protect juveniles
from the harsher aspects of the criminal justice system.23
While history evidences society's apparent reluctance to
treat juvenile offenders as harshly as adult offenders, 24 early
America had no special facilities for the correction or rehabilita-
tion of errant youth.25 Thus, juvenile prosecutions, although
relatively infrequent, took place in adult criminal courts. 26 A
conviction subjected the juvenile to the full range of harsh crim-
inal penalties, including possible confinement in an adult peni-
tentiary, or even death.27 This treatment was perceived as
extreme, especially in light of the beliefs that children were "es-
sentially good,"28 and were particularly susceptible: to rehabili-
tation as well as to criminal influence. The foregoing perception
contributed to a gradual reformulation of the early juvenile jus-
23. FRANCIS BARRY McCARTHiry AND JAMES G. CARR, JUVENILE LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 287 (2d ed. 1989) (excerpting a commentary from the National Advisory
Committee's 1976 report on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention).
24. See, e.g., MERRIL SOBIE, THE CREATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: A HISTORY
OF NEW YORK'S CHILDREN'S LAWS 5-12 (1987) (discussing, inter alia, the historical
common law "presumption of infancy," which firmly presumed that a child between
the ages of seven and fourteen lacked the criminal capacity necessary to establish
guilt; thereby reducing the likelihood of criminal conviction and severe criminal
sanctioning of juveniles); Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
25. See HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA Vol. 1,
307 (Robert H. Bremner, ed. 1970).
26. See SOBIE, supra note 24, at 5, 25-26; Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
27. See SOME, supra note 24, at 5, 25-26.
28. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
19971
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tice process.29 Thus, the turn of the Twentieth Century saw the
establishment of autonomous juvenile courts, which were to ex-
ist and function independently of the criminal courts which had
previously maintained jurisdiction over juvenile proceedings. 30
The primary goal of the specialized court was to afford the child
an individualized application of justice, focusing on the care and
rehabilitation of the child rather than his punishment.31
One notable development during this transitional period
away from criminal courts was the "decriminalization" of juve-
nile misconduct. 32 Further observation of this period revealed
the fact that children were often brought before the juvenile
courts on relatively trivial charges or on matters in which fault
was not attributable to the child.33 Consequently, judges in ju-
venile courts adopted paternalistic inclinations, fashioning indi-
vidual dispositions that focused on the child's environment and
best interests, rather than on the actual crime committed as
29. See SOBIE, supra note 24, at 25-26; Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
30. See SOBIE, supra note 24, at 97-106. The Nation's first Juvenile Court was
established in 1899 by the Illinois Legislature. See id. at 104 n.331. While some
areas of New York had previously established separate children's court Parts, a
juvenile court completely independent of the criminal court was not established in
New York until 1922. See id. at 130; Children's Court Act 1922 N.Y. Laws 547.
31. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15; SOBIE, supra note 24, at 98-99, 105-06. Segre-
gated juvenile proceedings enabled exclusively-assigned judges to become familiar
with the appropriate child care agencies, develop specialized knowledge, and be-
come more attuned to the unique dispositional alternatives available in juvenile
cases; all with a view toward achieving individualized justice effectively tailored
toward the child's particular needs. See SOBIE, supra note 24, at 103.
32. See SOBIE, supra note 24, at 112. See e.g., 1909 N.Y. Laws 478 (providing
that "[a] child of more than seven and less than sixteen years of age, who shall
commit any act or omission which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not
punishable by death or life imprisonment, shall not be deemed guilty of any crime,
but ofjuvenile delinquency only..."); SoBmE, supra note 24, at 126; 1907 N.Y. Laws
417 (removing civil penalties, such as abrogation of future voting rights and dis-
qualification from future service as a juror, which had traditionally attached upon
an adjudication of delinquency); SOBIE, supra note 24,'at 114-15; 1910 N.Y. Laws
659, § 39 (stating that "so far as it is consistent with the interest of the child and of
the state [the court shall] consider the child not upon trial for the commission of a
crime, but as a child in need of the care and protection of the state."); SOBIE, supra
note 24, at 115 n.365.
33. See SOBIE, supra note 24, at 119-20, 144. Many juvenile arrests were for
minor offenses; such as petty larceny, breach of peace, and even ballplaying in the
street. See id. Juvenile courts were also responsible for hearing charges of paren-
tal neglect and improper guardianship. See id.
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/5
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was the practice in criminal courts.34 Another major conse-
quence of the separation of juvenile courts from criminal courts
was the removal from New York's Penal Code of the substantive
laws governing children.35 This extraction generated confusion
concerning which procedures would govern the newly-segre-
gated juvenile proceedings. 36
To cope with these transitions, the specialized juvenile
courts resorted to experimentation. 37 The juvenile court would
often dispense with traditional procedural protections in favor
of an informal process, in the belief that informality would most
effectively protect and rehabilitate the wayward child.38 While
procedural due process requirements were never officially elimi-
nated, they were largely disregarded in the increasingly infor-
mal juvenile proceeding.39 The primary focal points of such
proceedings were protection and rehabilitation of the child,
even if that meant committing the child to an institution with-
out the benefit of basic procedural safeguards. 40 This abroga-
34. See id. at 120-22; Gault, 387 U.S. at 25-26. "The juvenile judge tended to
view his role as patriarchal. He pictured himself as the benevolent judge who
placed his arm around a youngster and prevented future criminality through sheer
concern and persuasion." See SOBIE, supra note 24, at 122.
35. See SOME, supra note 24, at 117, 119-20, 144. These substantive laws
were subsequently recodified as the Children's Court Act of 1922 (repealed 1962).
See id.
36. See id. at 117-18, 140. The 1922 Act was portentously unclear on this
issue. See id. at 139-40. Whereas the procedural protections applicable in crimi-
nal proceedings; such as the right to adequate notice, the right to confrontation,
the right to cross-examination of witnesses, and the requirements of sworn testi-
mony and proof beyond a reasonable doubt; were previously presumed applicable
in juvenile cases heard under the unified system, the segregation of juvenile pro-
ceedings prompted the question of whether these procedures were still supposed to
govern in the independent juvenile courts. See id. at 118.
37. See SOME, supra note 24, at 122-23, 140, 146; Gault 387 U.S. at 15-17
(citing protectionist theories to explain the retreat from the rigid adversarialness
of the criminal procedure law).
38. See SOBME, supra note 24, at 122-23, 140.
39. See id. at 122-23.
40. See id. at 123-24.
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of
crime, to end in maturer years in public punishment and disgrace, the Leg-
islature surely may provide for the salvation of such a child.., by bringing
it into one of the courts of the state without any process at all, for the pur-
pose of subjecting it to the state's guardianship and protection.
See id. at 123 n.394 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905) (em-
phasis added)).
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tion of procedure was generally justified by invocation of the
common law doctrine of parens patriae.41 The courts reasoned
that procedural due process was unnecessary, since they were
merely acting in their parens patriae capacity as "surrogate par-
ents" in order to help the child, rather than to punish or subject
him to stigmatism.42 In accordance with the foregoing events,
juvenile proceedings were classified as "civil" rather than "crim-
inal," further justifying the departure from traditional criminal
procedural protections. 43 Thus developed the informality that
subsequently became the hallmark of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, and ultimately prompted the United States Supreme
Court decision In re Gault.44
41. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-17 (explaining that the parens patriae doctrine
presumed "that a child, unlike an adult, has a right 'not to liberty, but to custody,'"
and that absent a right to liberty, the child suffered no deprivation -no matter
how the state obtained custody over him- and thus was not entitled to any proce-
dural protections); SoBE, supra note 24, at 88, 122-23 (quoting the assertion of In
re Donohue, 1 Abb. N. Cas. 1, 6-8 (Sup. Ct., 1st. Dep't 1876), that "the state as
parens patriae, has the original right to the control and disposition of all minors. It
confides a part of its right to a parent as a trust.").
42. See SOBME, supra note 24, at 123.
The natural parent needs no process to temporarily deprive his child of its
liberty by confining it in his own home, to save it and to shield it froih the
consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness: nor is the state,
when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for the
same purpose, required to adopt any process as a means of placing its hands
upon the child to lead it into one of its courts. When the child gets there,
and the court, with the power to save it, determines on its salvation, and not
its punishment, it is immaterial how it got there.
See id. at 123 n.394 (quoting Fisher, 62 A. at 200); see also Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-
17.
43. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-17.
The juvenile court laws ... are the result of plans promoted by humane and
forward-looking people to provide a system of courts, procedures, and sanc-
tions deemed to be less harmful and more lenient to children than adults.
For this reason such state laws generally provide less formal and less public
methods for the trial of children. In line with this policy, both courts and
legislators have shrunk back from labeling these laws as 'criminal' and have
preferred to call them 'civil.'
Id. at 59 (Black, J., concurring).
44. See SOME, supra note 24, at 124, 145; Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-18 ("[Tlhe
highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for
juveniles, . . . [but] in practice, . . . the results have not been entirely satisfac-
tory.... Departures from established principles of due process have frequently
resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.").
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/5
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B. The Contributions of In re Gault
Despite the decriminalization of juvenile crime and the pa-
ternalistic, rehabilitative intent of the juvenile courts, a "delin-
quency" adjudication continued to invoke connotations and
consequences comparable to those associated with a criminal
conviction. 45 This reality, coupled with the juvenile courts' over-
all disregard of the procedural safeguards that had been devel-
oped to promote truth-finding and deter erroneous deprivations,
presented itself to the United States Supreme Court in the case
of In re Gault.46
In Gault, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was arrested after a
neighbor alleged that Gerald and his friend made lewd com-
ments to her over the telephone. 47 Although Gerald was taken
into custody and temporarily detained in a children's detention
center, no attempt was made to notify his parents of his arrest,
nor were other traditional due process protections afforded dur-
ing the delinquency proceedings against him.48 Gerald was sub-
sequently adjudged delinquent, and committed to the State
Industrial School for the remainder of his minority "unless
sooner discharged by due process of law. '49 After exhausting
45. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-24, 27. "A proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be delinquent and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." Id. at 36.
See SOBME, supra note 24, at 127-28; see also People v. Pollack, 154 A.D. 716, 720,
139 N.Y.S. 831, 883 (2d Dep't 1913) (recognizing that "[the] new classification,...
known as 'juvenile delinquency,'. . . though excluded expressly from the degree of
statutory crime, was in its nature quasi-criminal, whatever words were used to
characterize it."); In re Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 224 N.E.2d 102, 106, 277
N.Y.S.2d 675, 680 (1966) (holding that delinquency actions "are at the very least
quasi-criminal in nature"); People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 37, 155 N.E. 584 (1927)
(holding that the mere substitution of words could not alter the proceeding's crimi-
nal nature).
46. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see id. at 19-24; see generally infra note 185. The 1967
Gault decision was one of the first in the Supreme Court's history involving juve-
nile justice. See SOBME, supra note 24, at 165 n.541.
47. See Gault 387 U.S. at 4.
48. See id. at 5-8.
49. Id. at 7-8. The age of majority being twenty-one, Gerald thus received a
potential six-year sentence for his "adolescent variety" phone call. See id. at 4, 7-8,
29. Had Gerald been over eighteen when he committed this same act, he would
have been tried as an adult, afforded the full range of procedural protections, and
even then been subjected to a maximum penalty of not more than $50 or two
months imprisonment. See id. at 29.
19971
9
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:85
his state remedies to no avail, Gerald appealed his case to the
United States Supreme Court.50
On review, the Supreme Court recounted the historical the-
ories which originally sanctioned the relaxation of procedure in
juvenile proceedings. 51 However, the Court declined to endorse
those views blindly.5 2 Instead, the Court scrutinized the
claimed benefits afforded the juvenile by the informal system to
determine whether those benefits actually existed, and if so,
whether they outweighed the patent disadvantages associated
with the absence of normal due process. 53 In so doing, the Court
expressed doubt as to the validity of the belief that informality
itself actually benefitted the child. 54 The Court further sug-
gested that modern juvenile courts were not providing the indi-
vidualized attention that the informal system was intended to
promote.55 Moreover, the Court observed that essentially, a de-
linquency adjudication is substantially akin to a criminal con-
viction.56 While the Court conceded that some of the principles
behind the informal system were valuable, it nevertheless re-
versed the lower court, ultimately concluding that the proposed
50. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. Having no right of appeal in juvenile cases under
Arizona law, Gerald petitioned the appropriate state court for a writ of habeas
corpus. See id. at 4, 8. Gerald alleged that the Arizona Juvenile Code was uncon-
stitutional on its face and as applied because, inter alia, it did not provide for ade-
quate notification of charges; did not provide for appellate review; denied the
rights to counsel, confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination; al-
lowed the use of hearsay testimony; and failed to require that the proceedings be
recorded. See id. at 9-10. The Supreme Court of Arizona subsequently affirmed
the dismissal of Gerald's petition, concluding that the proceedings against him did
not offend the constitutional requirements of due process. See id. at 4.
51. See id. at 14-22; see also supra Part II.A.
52. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-22. "[I]t is important, we think, that the claimed
benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised." Id. at 21.
53. See id. at 21-22. For example, the Court conceded that processing the ju-
venile separately from the adult, declining to classify the juvenile as a "criminal,"
and affording him individualized attention were "commendable principles" of the
juvenile system. See id. at 22-26. On the other hand, the Court indicated that an
absence of traditional due process might endanger "the appearance as well as the
actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness." Id. at 26.
54. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
55. See id. at 17-19, 25-28.
56. See id. at 27, 36 ("A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will
be found to be delinquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is compa-
rable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."); id. at 29 ("The essential difference
between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to
adults were discarded in Gerald's case.").
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/5
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benefits neither necessitated, nor justified, a complete lack of
procedural due process.57
The Court explained that "[d]epartures from established
principles of due process have frequently resulted not in en-
lightened procedure, but in arbitrariness."8 Stressing the solid
relationship between adequate due process and the fundamen-
tal right of individual liberty,5 9 the Court opined that "it would
be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the proce-
dural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase
'due process."' 60 In essence, the Supreme Court ignored the
traditional rhetoric which proclaimed that a retreat from rigid
criminal due process was required to meet the "unique" needs of
juveniles on trial, and instead examined the reality of the juve-
nile delinquency proceeding.61 Consequently, the Supreme
Court declared that in an adjudicatory proceeding which may
result in a loss of freedom, the juvenile is entitled to many of
the fundamental due process protections constitutionally guar-
anteed in adult criminal proceedings. 62 Specifically, the juve-
nile and his parents are entitled to timely notice of the charges
against him, 63 and both must be apprised of his right to coun-
sel.64 The juvenile also must be advised of his privilege against
self-incrimination, 65 and be afforded the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses against him.66
57. See id. at 22-27 (noting that the juvenile judge's parens patriae power is
not unlimited, and is by no means an "invitation to procedural arbitrariness;" in-
stead reasoning that the favorable practices of the juvenile system need not mutu-
ally exclude the fundamentals of due process); see also discussion supra note 53.
58. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19.
59. See id. at 20 ("Due process of law is the primary and indispensable founda-
tion of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact
which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state
may exercise.").
60. Id. at 27-28.
61. See generally Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
62. See id. at 4, 13, 22, 31-59.
63. See id. at 33.
64. See id. at 36-41.
65. See id. at 47-55.
66. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 56-57. While the Court indicated its preference for
a right of appellate review, it found that due process did not obligate the states to
provide this right. See id. at 58.
1997]
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C. New York and Juvenile Procedure After Gault
The Gault decision triggered much litigation in the area of
juvenile due process. 67 The self-proclaimed limits of the deci-
sion were tested, and its principles were occasionally extended
to other procedural rights and areas of the juvenile proceed-
ing.68 Against this backdrop, the New York Court of Appeals
had occasion to review New York's treatment of certain juvenile
issues that had not been conclusively addressed by Gault or its
progeny. 69 Particularly relevant to this Note is the New York
Court of Appeals decision People ex rel. Silbert v. Cohen.70
In Silbert, two juveniles were adjudged delinquents and ul-
timately confined to a State Training School. 71 Subject to the
requirement that they abide by court-specified conditions, both
boys were subsequently released from the institution on pa-
role.72 Soon thereafter, it was alleged that the boys had violated
a condition of their parole. 73 Without a hearing, parole was re-
voked and both boys were remanded back to the State Training
School. 74 The Appellate Division held that "[r]evocation of pa-
role, whether of a juvenile or an adult, is a deprivation of lib-
erty," and granted the boys' habeas corpus petitions.75 The
67. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); People ex rel. Silbert v. Co-
hen, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971); McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
68. See, e.g., Breed, 421 U.S. at 519 (extending the privilege against double
jeopardy to juveniles); Silbert, 29 N.Y.2d at 15, 271 N.E.2d at 910, 323 N.Y.S.2d at
424 (extending procedural protections to juveniles during post-adjudicatory parole
revocation proceedings); Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 368 (concluding that the due
process clause protects an accused against conviction unless guilt is established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and then extending this protection to juvenile
delinquency adjudications). But compare McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (finding that
due process does not require juvenile delinquency adjudications to be by jury trial).
69. See, e.g., Silbert, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422 (ad-
dressing the impact of due process on post-adjudicatory juvenile parole revocation
proceedings); In re Daniel D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, cert.
den., D. v. County of Onondaga, 403 U.S. 926 (1970) (addressing, prior to McK-
eiver, whether juveniles had a due process right to jury trials).
70. 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971).
71. See id. at 13-14, 271 N.E.2d at 909, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 423; see generally
infra note 171.
72. See Silbert, 29 N.Y.2d at 13-14, 271 N.E.2d at 909, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. People ex rel. Silbert v. Cohen, 36 A.D.2d 331, 332, 320 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609
(2d Dep't 1971), affd, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971).
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Court further concluded that "due process requires that a fair
hearing precede such a deprivation."76 The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed. 77
Analyzing the question of whether the juveniles were enti-
tled to a hearing on the issue of parole revocation, the New York
Court of Appeals applied the rationale behind its prior decision,
People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden.78 In Menechino, the Court
reasoned that a parole revocation proceeding was "an accusa-
tory proceeding in which the outcome-liberty or imprison-
ment-is dependent upon the board's factual determination as
to the truth of specific allegations of misconduct."79 In addition,
Menechino emphasized that the purpose of the parole system is
to engender rehabilitation of convicted wrongdoers to the bene-
fit of society.80 In order to effectively achieve that end,
Menechino argued it was critical to instill in the parolee the
feelings of fair and objective treatment associated with due
process.8'
Based on these actualities, the Silbert Court concluded that
revocation proceedings subjected parolees to a potential depri-
vation of liberty, and the proceedings, therefore, "[fell] within
the protective ambit of due process."8 2 Holding that due process
itself guarantees, inter alia, a hearing before an individual may
be so deprived, Silbert essentially declared that it was irrele-
vant whether that individual was a child or an adult.8 3 Thus,
while Silbert conceded that it was not desirable to overly en-
cumber the juvenile proceeding with formality, the Court never-
theless concluded that the Menechino principles and due
76. Id.
77. See Silbert, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422.
78. 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971). In Menechino,
the particular issue before the Court was whether an adult parolee had a constitu-
tional right to the assistance of counsel at a parole revocation hearing. See id.
However, the rationale for concluding that the assistance of counsel was constitu-
tionally required constituted the foundation for the Court's decision in Silbert. See
Silbert, 29 N.Y.2d at 14-15, 271 N.E.2d at 909-10, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
79. Menechino, 27 N.Y.2d at 382, 267 N.E.2d at 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
80. See id. at 385-86, 318 N.E.2d at 456, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
81. See id. at 386 ("[H]ardly anything could more seriously impede that impor-
tant [rehabilitative] goal than a belief.., that the law's machinery is arbitrary, too
busy, or impervious to the facts.").
82. Silbert, 29 N.Y.2d at 14, 271 N.E.2d at 910, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
83. See id. at 15, 271 N.E.2d at 910, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
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process procedures were equally applicable to juvenile
parolees. 84
III. The Due Process Inquiry
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits
state action that "deprive[s] any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law."8 5 This clause is intended to
shield against arbitrary and capricious government actions that
infringe upon protected individual rights.86 Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections extend to all "individuals," regardless of age.87
Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has explicitly
confirmed that "[there is no doubt that the Due Process Clause
is applicable in juvenile proceedings."88 Due process, however,
is not a fixed and immutable rule.8 9 It is flexible and only re-
quires "such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands."90 The dilemma arises, then, in determining the na-
ture and extent of the process due in a particular proceeding.91
In order to determine whether a particular procedure com-
ports with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process concept of
fundamental fairness, Mathews v. Eldridge92 directs that a
multi-step inquiry be undertaken.93 Foremost, it must be deter-
mined that a constitutionally protected interest exists, and that
such interest has been interfered with by state action.94 If such
an interference has occurred, the procedures afforded prior to
the deprivation must be examined to ascertain whether they
were constitutionally sufficient. 95 Determining whether a pro-
84. See id. at 16-17, 271 N.E.2d at 911, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 425-26 (noting that
the Menechino rehabilitation-rationale "takes on added importance when children
are involved").
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60
(1989).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Gault 387 U.S. at 13 (noting that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone").
88. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
89. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
90. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
91. See id.; Schall, 467 U.S. at 263; Gault, 387 U.S. at 13-14.
92. 424 U.S. 319.
93. See id. at 332-35; Kentucky Dep't of Corrections, 490 U.S. at 460.
94. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections, 490 U.S. at 460.
95. See id.
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cedure is constitutionally sufficient requires consideration of
three distinct factors: (1) the individual interest affected by the
state action; (2) the state interest embodied in the challenged
action; and (3) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the individ-
ual interest under the existing procedural scheme and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
-safeguards.96 These potentially competing interests must then
be balanced to assess whether the state has afforded the indi-
vidual adequate procedural protections in a particular case.97
A. The Determination of a Protected Interest
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process re-
quirement imposes constraints upon state actions which de-
prive individuals of protected "property" or "liberty" interests. 9
However, not every claimed interest falls within the ambit of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 99 Preliminarily, it must be deter-
mined whether the particular interest affected is indeed consti-
tutionally protected. 100 To warrant constitutional protection,
the interest at stake must amount to more than an obscure
need, desire, or hope; the claimed interest must have a legiti-
mate foundation.' 0 ' Legitimately protected property and liberty
interests are either derived from the due process clause itself,
or are conferred by state law. 0 2 Fourteenth Amendment princi-
ples of procedural due process are implicated whenever a state
seeks to significantly restrict an individual's enjoyment of a pro-
tected interest. 0 3 Following are three cases which exemplify
the United States Supreme Court's view of the type of interests
constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the first case, Morrissey v. Brewer,04 the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether due process required a hear-
96. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
97. See id. at 334-35, 348.
98. See id. at 332.
99. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections, 490 U.S. at 460.
100. See id.; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332.
101. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections, 490 U.S. at 460.
102. See id.
103. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976).
104. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
19971
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ing prior to the revocation of a convict's parole. 10 5 In evaluating
this question, the Court recognized that "whether any proce-
dural protections are due depends on the extent to which an
individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss."'106 In
other words, a constitutionally protected liberty interest will be
found where the nature of the claimed interest is such that its
abridgement would impose a "grievous loss" upon the individual
claiming protection. 0 7 Reviewing the historical function and
administration of parole, the Court noted that the concept of
parole is based on the understanding that a parolee is entitled
to retain his liberty as long as he substantially abides by the
parole conditions imposed upon him. 08 The Court further ob-
served that parole affords the parolee the liberty to do many of
the same things available to people who have never been con-
victed of a crime, and clearly allows the parolee a less restric-
tive lifestyle than confinement in prison. 10 9 Moreover, the
Court observed that revocation of parole often subjects the pa-
rolee to a lengthy term of incarceration. 110 Thus, even though
the liberty afforded by parole is conditional, the Court con-
cluded that its termination would indeed inflict a "grievous loss"
105. See id. at 472. Morrissey consolidated two appeals from dismissed
habeas corpus petitions. See id. at 474. Both petitioners had pled guilty to felony
charges and had been paroled after a brief period of incarceration. See id. at 472-
73. Subsequently, both paroles were revoked based on the written reports of their
parole officers, which alleged violations of the parole conditions. See id. The peti-
tioners contended that revocation of parole without a hearing to determine
whether cause existed for such revocation was a deprivation of due process. See id.
at 474.
106. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (citations omitted).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 477-80. The Court explained that the primary purpose of pa-
role is to facilitate reintegration so that the convict may become a productive mem-
ber of society as soon as he is able. See id. at 477. This end is promoted by placing
restrictive conditions upon the parolee's freedom, which generally encourage the
parolee to stay out of trouble, and enable the parole officer to maintain continued
contact and supervision over the parolee's behavior. See id. at 478-79. As a means
to discourage detrimental behavior, the parole officer is afforded broad discretion
to recommend revocation of parole and return to prison if a condition is breached.
See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478-79. Thus, the goals of parole will be effected only if
the parolee is ensured that his continued respect for the imposed conditions guar-
antees his continued liberty. See id.
109. See id. at 482.
110. See id.
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upon the parolee."' Therefore, the liberty interest affected
upon termination of parole falls under the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1 2
In the second case, Bell v. Burson,13 the Supreme Court
was required to determine whether procedural due process was
required prior to suspending an uninsured motorist's state is-
sued driver's license. 1 4 The Court noted that the state, in its
discretion, could have declined to issue drivers' licenses to unin-
sured motorists without implicating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 5 However, once a driver's license was granted, the
Court held that an "important interest" had inured to its holder,
as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 Thus, the
Court found that the nature of a state issued driver's license
was such that its suspension inflicted a loss serious enough to
warrant a finding of a constitutionally protected interest."17
Finally, in Goss v. Lopez," 8 the issue was whether a pub-
licly maintained school was required to afford its students a
hearing prior to, or within a reasonable time after, suspen-
111. See id. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Supreme Court was presented with
the similar question of whether due process required a hearing prior to the revoca-
tion of a convict's probation. See 411 U.S. 778, 779 (1973). Citing its recent Mor-
rissey decision, the Court found parole and probation "constitutionally
indistinguishable," and thus concluded that the revocation of probation, like the
revocation of parole, also imposed a serious deprivation of liberty upon the proba-
tioner as contemplated by the Fourthteenth Amendment. See id. at 781-82.
112. See id.
113. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
114. See id. at 535-36. Petitioner, a licensed but uninsured motorist in Geor-
gia, was involved in a car accident resulting in $5,000 damage. See id. at 537.
Under the circumstances, Georgia law required that his license be suspended, re-
gardless of fault, unless he posted a bond to cover the potential damage liability
against him. See id. at 535-36. Petitioner contended that without a hearing to
determine fault, deprivation of his license violated his right to due process. See id.
at 536.
115. See Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
116. See id. The Court noted that once issued, the continued possession of the
driver's license "may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood." Id.
117. See id. Indeed, in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), a majority of
the Supreme Court conceded, for the sake of the opinion, that a police officer even
had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in maintaining his choice of hair-
style. See id. at 244-45. A separate dissent was written to propose that the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause "clearly" contemplated a liberty interest in
personal appearance. See id. at 244 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
17
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sion.119 There, the Supreme Court confirmed that protected
property and liberty interests are frequently created by the
state through statutes or rules which grant certain benefits to
the individual. 120 Upon choosing to extend a particular right,
the state thereby creates a "legitimate claim of entitlement."' 2 '
In statutorily providing that public school students would be
suspended only for "misconduct," the Supreme Court found that
Ohio had created a legitimate entitlement to a public education
amounting to a protected property interest. 22 Moreover, the
Court found that the Ohio students also possessed a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in their reputation and good
name, since the disparagement of such reputation through alle-
gations of misconduct could lead to other injuries. 23 The
Supreme Court dismissed the argument that infringement of
these interests would not inflict "grievous loss" upon the stu-
dent. 24 Instead, the Court held that the interests were substan-
tial and could not be encroached upon "in complete disregard of
the Due Process Clause."1 25 Thus, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that state created property interests and constitutionally
conferred liberty interests were implicated. 126
119. See id. In Goss, an Ohio statute provided for free public education to all
children between the ages of five and twenty-one years of age. See id. at 573. The
statute also granted authority to the school principal to suspend a student in the
event of "misconduct." Id. at 567. Students suspended under the statute alleged
that it unconstitutionally violated their rights to due process, however, because it
permitted the school to abridge their rights to an education without affording them
a hearing prior to, or within a reasonable time after, suspension. See id. at 567-69.
120. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572-73.
121. Id. at 573. The states are not constitutionally obligated to provide their
citizens public education. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 574-75. The Court recognized that if the charges of misconduct
were noted in the students' school records, "those charges could seriously damage
the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as inter-
fere with later opportunities for higher education and employment." Goss, 419
U.S. at 575. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that an interest
in reputation, without more, did not amount to a constitutionally protected liberty
interest; acknowledging however, that damage to reputation coupled with some
other injury would warrant constitutional protection).
124. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 575-76.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 576.
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B. Assessing the Constitutional Sufficiency of the Accorded
Procedures
1. The Individual Interest
As discussed above, an individual may have a constitution-
ally protected liberty or property interest at stake in a given
state proceeding.127 Under the first prong of the Mathews test,
the extent to which that interest may be deprived by the chal-
lenged state action is a relevant factor to consider in determin-
ing whether such actions are constitutionally infirm. 128
Commensurate with the gravity of the protected interest at
stake, the individual also possesses an interest in obtaining an
accurate factual resolution of issues which, if erroneously de-
cided, might result in a wrongful deprivation. 29 Consequently,
the personal interest in accuracy should be given due regard in
evaluating the constitutional sufficiency of the attendant proce-
dures. 30 The likely duration of any wrongful deprivation is also
relevant to the evaluation.' 31 Consideration of this element
should include the availability of timely appellate review. 32 Fi-
nally, an individual may have a legitimate interest in proce-
dures which limit the degree of discretion afforded to an official
decision-maker. 133
127. See supra notes 92-126 and accompanying text.
128. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341, 347 (1976); see also supra
notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
129. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 765 (1982) (noting that an
individual has a "commanding" interest in a fair and accurate determination in a
proceeding in which a fundamental liberty interest may be deprived, and a coexist-
ent interest in avoiding erroneous deprivations); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78
(1985) (describing the individual interest in accurate factual determinations in a
criminal proceeding as "uniquely compelling," given the fact that the fundamental
interests of life and liberty are at stake, and citing the panoply of required proce-
dural safeguards-specifically designed to promote accuracy-as evidence of the
gravity of these interests).
130. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59; Ake, 70 U.S. at 78.
131. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42.
132. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59.
133. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 306-08 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that excessive judicial discretion may lead to unequal application of
the law, and may mask reliance on inappropriate criteria and arbitrary decision-
making; specifically, Justice Marshall suggested that the absence of sufficient
guidelines in detaining juveniles alleged to be delinquent may invite judges to de-
tain for the sole (and impermissible under our Constitution) purpose of teaching a
troublesome child a lesson).
1997]
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2. The State Interest
After assessing the individual interest at stake, the Ma-
thews test requires that the state interest embodied in the chal-
lenged procedure be examined. 34 In Santosky v. Kramer,135 the
United States Supreme Court expressly noted that a state has a
significant parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting
the welfare of its children.136 Correspondingly, the New York
State Legislature has articulated its particular interest in de-
termining and pursuing the "needs and best interests" of chil-
dren brought before it on delinquency petitions. 37 However, in
the same breath, New York cautioned that its desire to protect
the best interest of the child may be tempered by its commit-
ment to the protection of the community. 38 The United States
Supreme Court has asserted that the state's interest in protect-
ing the public from crime is both "legitimate and compelling."' 39
Thus, in evaluating the sufficiency of procedures accorded in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding, New York's obvious interest
in furthering the established goals of its Family Courts must be
considered; such as the effective rehabilitation of the wayward
child in accordance with the child's best interests, and the po-
tentially conflicting interest in protecting the safety and welfare
of the public. 40
134. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347; supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
135. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
136. See id. at 766. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 790 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("A democratic society
rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies."). Santosky involved a child-
protection action in which the New York Family Court had terminated the
Santosky's right to custody of their natural children based on a finding, by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, of permanent neglect. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at
751-52. Balancing the significant interests at stake, the Court held that adopting
such a neutral standard of proof violated principles of due process. See id. at 747-
48, 758, 765. See also Schall, 467 U.S. at 265-66.
137. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 1983) (enumerating the pur-
pose of Article Three of the Family Court Act); see also infra note 138.
138. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301 ("In any proceeding under [the Juvenile De-
linquency] Article, the court shall consider the needs and best interests of the re-
spondent as well as the need for protection of the community."); N.Y. Fm. CT. ACT
§ 301.1 commentary at 261 (McKinney 1983).
139. Schall, 467 U.S. at 264-65 (in part quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.
144, 155 (1960)).
140. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1; N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 301.1 commentary at
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Also relevant in the assessment of the constitutional suffi-
ciency of the process afforded is the state's additional interest,
analogous to that of the individual, in achieving fair and accu-
rate factual determinations. 141 The interest in accuracy is par-
ticularly weighty, given the state's parens patriae concerns,
where the factual determination involves the welfare of a
child. 142 Another consideration in the test for constitutional suf-
ficiency is the state's interest in avoiding any undue adminis-
trative and financial burdens that might result if heightened
procedural safeguards were constitutionally mandated. 43 Also
relevant at this stage are the potential costs to society of such a
mandate, such as the effects of restricted resources and the po-
tential effect on the ultimate safety of the public. 44 Finally, it is
relevant to note that the imposition of a constitutionally man-
dated procedural scheme may implicate the state's interest in
avoiding increased federal court intrusion into matters tradi-
tionally left to the state. 45 In matters involving juveniles, the
Supreme Court itself has specifically acknowledged "the desira-
bility of flexibility and experimentation by the States." 46 In
contrast, it may be argued that in proceedings affecting
juveniles the state itself has an interest in greater formality,
since increased procedural safeguards may instill in the child
the sense that he is being treated with fairness in a virtuous
system deserving of his respect and cooperation. 47
3. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
"[Pirocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of
error inherent in the truthfinding process .... ,,141 Thus, the
fairness and reliability of the existing procedures must be con-
sidered in assessing their constitutional sufficiency, as must the
probable value of affording added procedural safeguards. 49 A
141. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766.
142. See id. at 766-67.
143. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347-48.
144. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 143.
145. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 770-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
146. Schall, 467 U.S. at 275 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 114
(1971)).
147. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 308-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 636 n.22 (1979).
148. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
149. See id. at 343.
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primary purpose in imposing procedural constraints prior to a
final deprivation of a protected interest is to promote accuracy
in factual determinations. 150 Theoretically, a hearing before an
impartial tribunal, attendant with all of the traditional proce-
dural safeguards, increases the likelihood that accurate and
truthful conclusions will emerge from the mass of disputed in-
formation presented.' 5 ' Thus, due process is designed to reduce
the risk of error. 52 The degree of procedural safeguards pro-
vided will influence the likelihood of reaching an erroneous fac-
tual determination in favor of or against a number of competing
interests. 53 Consequently, in assessing the constitutional suffi-
ciency of the accorded procedures, the goal is to fairly allocate
the risk of erroneous fact-finding, relative to those interests
which are deemed of greater significance.15 4
Assuming that the existing procedures consist of some sort
of factual hearing or inquiry, it is relevant to examine the ex-
tent to which issues of witness credibility and veracity factor
into the decision-making process.155 The degree of subjectivity
and discretion called for in the factual determination may pro-
portionally affect the risk of error, and therefore is also relevant
to the evaluation. 56 The resources available to the state in as-
sembling its case, as compared to those available to the individ-
ual in preparing its defense, similarly relate to the assessment
of inherent risk. 57 It is also pertinent to consider whether the
150. See STONE, SEIDMAN, ET. AL., CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw 992 (2d ed. 1991);
Schall, 467 U.S. at 303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("One of the purposes of im-
posing procedural constraints on decisions affecting life, liberty, or property is to
reduce the incidence of error."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1967) (noting that
procedural safeguards are the "best instruments" for ascertaining facts and uncov-
ering truth).
151. See STONE, supra note 150, at 992.
152. See id.; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 786 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (analyzing
the effects of applying a heightened standard of proof).
153. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761, 786.
154. See id.
155. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-44.
156. See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, 762-63 (voicing concerns about the potential
role of cultural or class bias in proceedings which frequently affect the indigent,
the uneducated, or members of minority groups).
157. See id. at 763-64 (contemplating, inter alia, the individual's right to
court-appointed counsel, the presumptive expertise of the state on the issues in-
volved, and situations in which state employees are both investigators and pri-
mary witnesses).
106 [Vol. 18:85
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/5
IN RE EDWIN L.
existing process affords the individual an opportunity to chal-
lenge the accuracy of the facts relied upon and the correctness
of the conclusions reached against him.158
Where the official action involves a deprivation based on
the result of a factual determination, there is a broad range of
procedural safeguards additionally or alternatively available. 159
In fact, the alternatives may extend as far as a comprehensive
evidentiary hearing complete with the "full panoply" of adver-
sarial protections guaranteed in criminal trials; such as the
right to counsel, 60 the exclusion of hearsay testimony coupled
with the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses, 16' and the right to compulsory process. 62
As noted above, insufficient procedures increase the risk of
erroneous deprivations. 163 Since error has no theoretical social
value, it is likely that, where the interests of the individual and
the state are essentially equivalent, this third factor (the risk of
error and the feasibility of imposing additional safeguards),
may be the determinative and swaying factor in ascertaining
the constitutional sufficiency of the attendant procedures.'6
C. Balancing the Criteria
Even if it is concluded that a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest is at stake, and that some procedural due process
protections are thus warranted, the question still remains of the
standard of process that is due in the particular case. 65 As
noted above, Fourteenth Amendment principles of due process
are satisfied as long as the state provides the quantum of proce-
dural safeguards that "the particular situation demands." 66
158. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 345-46.
159. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 274-75; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344-45.
160. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 274-75; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); U.S. CONST. amend. VI, amend.
XIV, § 1.
161. See Schall, 467 U.S. 274-75; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); U.S.
CONST. amend. VI, amend. XIV, § 1.
162. See Schall, 467 U.S. 274-75; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967);
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, amend. XIV, § 1; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344-45.
163. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
164. See Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1004 (2d Cir. 1994).
165. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481; Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977).
166. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481; see supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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The test for evaluating whether the accorded procedural safe-
guards are constitutionally sufficient is set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge.167 Mathews requires a balancing of the criteria dis-
cussed above: (1) the personal interest affected by the state ac-
tion, (2) the state interest embodied in the challenged action,
and (3) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the individual inter-
est under the existing procedural scheme and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards. 168 Thus, an official action will pass constitutional mus-
ter if it furthers state interests which sufficiently outweigh the
individual interests affected, and if it provides procedural safe-
guards which sufficiently prevent undue abridgements of con-
stitutionally protected interests.169
IV. The Case of In re Edwin L.
A. Facts
In re Edwin L.170 originated in Family Court following alle-
gations that thirteen-year-old Edwin had committed acts which
would have constituted crimes if committed by an adult.' 71 Sub-
sequently, a fact-finding hearing was held at which the Family
Court concluded, based upon admissions made by Edwin, that
Edwin's conduct, if committed by an adult, would indeed have
167. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
168. See id. at 334-35, 348; see supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
169. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra text ac-
companying notes 92-103, 168.
170. 88 N.Y.2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1996).
171. See id. at 597, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 851. In New York, a
child below the age of sixteen is not considered criminally responsible for his con-
duct. See Schall, 467 U.S. 253, 257 n.4; N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney
1983) (defining a "juvenile delinquent" as "a person over seven and less than six-
teen years of age, who, having committed an act that would constitute a crime if
committed by an adult, (a) is not criminally responsible for such conduct by reason
of infancy. . . "). If the child commits an act that would constitute a crime if com-
mitted by an adult, the child comes under the jurisdiction of the Family Court. See
Schall, 467 U.S. at 257 n.4; § 302.1(1) ("The Family Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over any proceeding to determine whether a person is a juvenile delin-
quent."). Edwin was charged with conduct which, if committed by an adult, would
have constituted the crimes of criminal mischief in the fourth degree and posses-
sion of burglar's tools. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648
N.Y.S.2d at 851.
[Vol. 18:85
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/5
19971 IN RE EDWIN L. 109
constituted the crimes alleged. 172 A dispositional hearing was
then scheduled, 173 at which Edwin sought and was granted an
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ("ACD").174 Pursu-
ant to the terms of the ACD order, Edwin was required to con-
tinue living at the residential facility where he had been placed
a few years earlier as a result of a child neglect proceeding, 175
172. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
A "fact-finding hearing" is the juvenile equivalent of a trial. See Schall, 467 U.S. at
258 n.8. Thus, it is an adjudicatory proceeding, held to ascertain whether the re-
spondent in fact committed (is guilty of) the acts alleged. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 301.2(6).
173. If "guilt" is established at the fact-finding hearing, the Family Court is
then required to schedule a "dispositional hearing." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 345.1(1);
see Schall, 467 U.S. at 258 n.8. The dispositional hearing is akin to a criminal
sentencing hearing, see Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 614, 671 N'E.2d at 1258, 648
N.Y.S.2d at 861; McCARTHY AND CARR, supra note 23, at 453, and is held to deter-
mine whether the respondent requires "supervision, treatment or confinement."
§ 301.2(7). A formal adjudication ofjuvenile delinquency cannot be entered unless
both determinations are in the affirmative: that is, that a crime has in fact been
committed, and that the juvenile requires supervision, treatment or confinement.
See § 352.1; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 commentary at 266 (McKinney 1983). If
guilt is not established at the fact-finding hearing, the charges must be dismissed.
See § 345.1(2).
174. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 851;
see generally supra note 11. The juvenile probation department had submitted a
report noting that Edwin had no prior legal history, that he was doing well in
school, that he "does not appear to be a danger to the community or himself," and
that he was generally "a likable young man who has had some unfortunate inci-
dents in his life." See Brief for Appellant at 7-8, In re Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d 593, 671
N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996) (No. 662-91 and 665-91 (con-
solidated by court)) (in part quoting the Probation Department's Investigation and
Report). The probation department recommended that Edwin be conditionally dis-
charged (paroled). See id. at 8. However, with the state's agreement, the court
ultimately agreed to grant the ACD instead. See id. No errors were assigned to
these initial proceedings. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597-99, 671 N.E.2d at 1248-
49, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52; Appellant's Brief at 2-5, Edwin L., (No. 662-91 and
665-91 (consolidated by court)) (summarizing issues and arguments presented on
appeal).
175. According to the probation report, Edwin's mother had been an I.V. drug
abuser and had died of AIDS in 1992. See Appellant's Brief at 7 n.4, Edwin L, (No.
662-91 and 665-91 (consolidated by court)). Edwin's father was reportedly in a
Puerto Rico prison. See id. In approximately 1989, child neglect proceedings had
revealed that Edwin was a neglected child. See id. at 7. Consequently, Edwin had
been placed in a residential facility for children, which is where he was residing at
the time of the scheduled dispositional hearing. See id. However, according to the
probation report, someone was in the process of adopting Edwin at the time of
these proceedings. See id. Thus, the residency requirement was subject to Edwin's
expected adoption. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648
N.Y.S.2d at 851.
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attend school, and avoid further contact with the courts for a
period of six months. 176
Less than two weeks before the ACD was to have matured
into a dismissal, the presentment agency 177 sought its vacatur,
alleging that Edwin had breached its conditions. 78 At Edwin's
behest, a hearing was held to determine whether any conditions
of the ACD order had in fact been violated. 79 In support of its
vacatur petition, the presentment agency offered the testimony
of only one witness, a residential facility caseworker.8 0 Rather
than providing non-hearsay testimony based upon her own per-
sonal knowledge, the caseworker's testimony consisted primar-
ily of information which she had learned from reading police
reports and from other sources.' 8 ' Nevertheless, the Family
Court denied Edwin's motion to strike the caseworker's testi-
176. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597-98, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648 N.Y.S.2d at
851.
177. In New York, the "presentment agency" is the party assigned to repre-
sent the state's interests in a juvenile delinquency action. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 301.2(12), 254(a). Thus, the presentment agency's role is analogous to that of
the prosecutor in a criminal action.
178. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 598, 671 N.E.2d at 1248,648 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
Based on the supporting deposition of the residential facility security manager,
(which concluded that Edwin was beyond the facility's control and was in need of a
more structured environment, see Brief for Respondent at. 5, In re Edwin L., 88
N.Y.2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996) (No. 662-91
and 665-91 (consolidated by court)), the presentment agency alleged, inter alia,
that Edwin had been absent from the residential facility without permission on
two separate dates during the six month period, that he had been arrested on both
of those dates, and that his behavior at school had deteriorated. See Edwin L., 88
N.Y.2d at 598, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
179. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 598-99, 671 N.E.2d at 1248-49, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 851-52. The Family Court Act does not expressly entitle the juvenile to a hear-
ing prior to revocation of an ACD. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 315.3(1). Instead, after
discussing the court's discretion to set the conditions of the ACD, the Act simply
states that "[upon ex parte motion by the presentment agency, or upon the court's
own motion, made . . .at any time during [the ACD's] duration, the court may
restore the matter to the calendar." See id.
180. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 598-99, 671 N.E.2d at 1248-49, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 851-52; see also id. at 607-08, 671 N.E.2d at 1254, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (Levine,
J., dissenting).
181. See id. According to the dissent, it was "clear that the witness in fact had
no personal knowledge of the arrests and AWOL incidents, which were the more
serious violations, and the most relevant to any decision to terminate Edwin L.'s
ACD." Id. at 607-08, 671 N.E.2d at 1254, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 857. The presentment
agency neither called the deponent who claimed first-hand knowledge of the al-
leged violations, nor sought to introduce as business records any documentation of
the arrests or other violations alleged. See id.
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/5
19971 IN RE EDWIN L. 111
mony on the ground that it was based on hearsay, and subse-
quently relied on the challenged evidence to conclude that
Edwin had indeed violated the conditions of his ACD order. 8 2
The Family Court thus vacated the ACD order and restored the
matter to the calendar for further dispositional proceedings
against Edwin. 8 3
Edwin ultimately appealed his case to the New York Court
of Appeals.184 Edwin argued that before a Family Court may
consider whether a juvenile has violated a condition of an ACD
order, principles of procedural due process guarantee the juve-
nile a hearing at which hearsay evidence will be excluded, un-
less the court first finds good cause to dispense with the
182. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 598-99, 607-08, 671 N.E.2d at 1248-49, 1254,
648 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52, 857; Respondents' Brief at 7-8, Edwin L., (No. 662-91 and
665-91 (consolidated by court)).
183. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 599, 671 N.E.2d at 1249, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 852;
Respondents' Brief at 6, Edwin L., (No. 662-91 and 665-91 (consolidated by court)).
Since an ACD only postpones the original action pending possible dismissal, the
Family Court was still required to hold a dispositional hearing before Edwin could
be adjudged delinquent on the original charges. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 599,
671 N.E.2d at 1249, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 852; N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT §§ 315.3, 352.1; supra
notes 11, 173. However, Edwin waived his right to this dispositional hearing and
consented to placement with the Division of Youth for one year. See Edwin L., 88
N.Y.2d at 599, 671 N.E.2d at 1249, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 852. It is possible that Edwin
forewent the dispositional hearing in order to expedite the appellate process. See
generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 365.1. Since the Family Court had already deter-
mined that Edwin was in fact guilty of the underlying crimes, and that he had in
fact violated the conditions of his ACD, Edwin could reasonably have anticipated
that a formal adjudication of delinquency was inevitable. See supra notes 172-73,
182 and accompanying text. Pursuant to New York's Family Court Act, a juvenile
is entitled to appeal an order of disposition as of right. See § 365.1(1). However,
appeals from "any other orders," (such as ACD revocation orders), require permis-
sion of the appellate court. See § 365.2. Given the interlocutory nature of an ACD
revocation order, a petition for its appeal likely would have been an exercise in
futility. Cf McCARTHY AND CARR, supra note 23, at 375.
184. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 599, 671 N.E.2d at 1249, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
On the intermediate appeal, the Appellate Division had affirmed the Family
Court's dispositional orders, summarily holding that the evidence presented at the
revocation hearing was sufficient to justify a finding that Edwin had violated the
conditions of the ACD order, and further holding that the hearing satisfied proce-
dural due process requirements. See In re Edwin L., 215 A.D.2d 760, 627 N.Y.S.2d
963 (2d Dep't 1995), affd, 88 N.Y.2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850
(1996). Thereafter, Edwin took his appeal to the New York Court of Appeals as of
right. See In re Edwin L., 86 N.Y.2d 867, 659 N.E.2d 763, 635 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1995)
(mem.); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 365.1(1).
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confrontation of witnesses. 8 5 Edwin reasoned that ACD orders
that are granted post-fact-finding are functionally equivalent to
dispositional orders, 8 6 and are substantially analogous to the
dispositions of parole and probation in particular. 8 7 Thus, Ed-
win contended that his ACD revocation hearing should have ac-
corded him the same procedural protections guaranteed to both
juvenile respondents and adult defendants in parole revocation
and probation violation hearings. 88 Specifically, Edwin argued
185. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597, 599, 671 N.E.2d at 1248-49, 648
N.Y.S.2d at 851-52. The fundamental importance in our judicial system of the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses has been repeatedly empha-
sized. See e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is a "funda-
mental" right, and is thus binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause).
The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial proce-
dure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps
assure the 'accuracy of the truth-determining process.' It is, indeed, 'an es-
sential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this
country's constitutional goal.'
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (citations omitted). Chambers
further explained the import of the hearsay rule and the basis for its development
in relation to the right of confrontation and cross-examination:
The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and respected by virtually
every State, is based on experience and grounded in the notion that untrust-
worthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court
statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional in-
dicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other circum-
stances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the
declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not available
in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the [fact-
finder].
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298 (citation omitted). Chambers did note that hearsay
statements were not objectionable where the circumstances indicated that they
were likely reliable and truthful. See id. at 298-99, 302.
186. See generally supra notes 22, 173; infra note 191.
187. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 599, 671 N.E.2d at 1249, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
188. See id.; see generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 360.3(1) (guaranteeing the
juvenile the right to a hearing to determine whether he has violated a condition of
his parole or probation), 360.3(3) (indicating that only "relevant, competent and
material" evidence should be considered at such a hearing; and further guarantee-
ing the juvenile the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him); Morrissey,
408 U.S. at 487-89 (holding that before an individual's parole may be revoked, due
process guarantees the parolee the right to a hearing, the opportunity to be heard,
and the right to confront and cross-examine witness, unless the court specifically
finds good cause to dispense with such confrontation); Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778, 782
(holding that probationers are entitled to the same procedural protections guaran-
teed to parolees in Morrissey).
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that absent a finding of good cause, his right to confront the
witnesses, who were the actual source of the information used
against him in the ACD revocation proceeding, was unconstitu-
tionally deprived. 8 9
B. Majority Holding
A majority of the New York Court of Appeals rejected Ed-
win's claim.190 The majority distinguished the ACD from the
dispositions of parole and probation, stressing the fact that an
ACD is not a "dispositional" order.' 9' The majority detailed
both procedural differences in availability, and substantive dif-
ferences in repercussions, between ACD orders and disposi-
tional orders. 92 Specifically, the majority pointed out that an
ACD may be granted only prior to the conclusion of a disposi-
tional hearing and formal adjudication of juvenile delinquency,
while dispositional orders may be issued only after the conclu-
sion of the dispositional hearing and formal adjudication of de-
linquency. 93 The majority further explained that the ACD's
pre-adjudicatory nature was significant in that if the ACD were
revoked, the child would not immediately be subject to a loss of
freedom as he would upon revocation of parole or probation. 194
Instead, the child would still be entitled to a dispositional hear-
ing on the issue of whether he was in fact in need of supervision,
treatment, or confinement. 95
189. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 599, 671 N.E.2d at 1249, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 852;
supra note 186.
190. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 597, 671 N.E.2d at 1248, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
191. See id. at 600-02, 671 N.E.2d at 1250-01, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54. New
York's Family Court Act enumerates five types of dispositional orders which be-
come available to the court upon an adjudication of delinquency. See N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT §§ 352.2(1) (listing the five orders of disposition), 352.1 (requiring a delin-
quency adjudication before the court may impose a § 352.2 disposition). The ACD
is not one of those dispositional options. See §§ 352.2(1), 315.3(1) (noting that "[an
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is an adjournment of the proceeding
.(as opposed to an order of disposition)).
192. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 600-02, 671 N.E.2d at 1250-51, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 853-54.
193. See id. at 600, 671 N.E.2d at 1250, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 853; N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT §§ 315.3(1), 352.1(1).
194. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 600-01, 671 N.E.2d at 1250-51, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 853-54.
195. See id.; compare N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 360.3(6) (authorizing revocation of
probation, and thus loss of freedom, immediately following the probation violation
hearing), with § 315.3(1) and § 352.1(1) (together providing that, upon revocation
19971
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The majority did concede, however, that some similarities
do exist between an ACD and the dispositional orders of condi-
tional discharge and probation. 196 For example, with each, "the
juvenile's continued freedom is contingent upon the satisfaction
of the [court-ordered] conditions."197 Moreover, each order may
constrain the juvenile's liberty only minimally. 198 However, the
majority pointed out that the pre-adjudicatory ACD entitles the
juvenile to a "clean record" upon satisfaction of its conditions;
since the case is deemed dismissed, the juvenile's records will be
sealed. 199 In contrast, the records in a case in which a formal
adjudication of delinquency has been entered will rarely be
sealed, even upon the successful completion of probation or pa-
role conditions. 200 Thus, the successful expiration of an ACD,
unlike a delinquency finding, ensures that the child will not be
burdened with a potential predicate offense. 20'
Weighing the significance of the noted distinctions, the ma-
jority concluded that a juvenile's liberty interest in a pre-adjudi-
catory ACD, as opposed to the liberty interest implicated by a
dispositional order, is limited.20 2 In essence, the majority con-
cluded that ACD revocation proceedings do not warrant the
of an ACD, the matter must be restored to the calendar for a dispositional hearing
before one of the more restrictive § 352.2(1) dispositions may be imposed).
196. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 600-01, 671 N.E.2d at 1250, 648 N.Y.S.2d at
853.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See id.; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 375.1(1). Although the terminology appears
counter-intuitive, an ACD may be both "post-fact-finding" and "pre-adjudicatory."
As previously discussed, the ACD is "post- fact-finding" if it is granted after the
court has held a hearing to determine guilt. See supra notes 22, 172. However,
since a formal adjudication of delinquency cannot be entered until after the court
has also held a dispositional hearing and determined that the juvenile is in need of
supervision, treatment or confinement, the ACD is also considered "pre-adjudica-
tory." See supra notes 172-73. Compare supra note 191.
200. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 600-01, 671 N.E.2d at 1250, 648 N.Y.S.2d at
853; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 375.2 (designating the limited circumstances under
which records may be sealed after a delinquency finding).
201. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 600-01, 671 N.E.2d at 1250, 648 N.Y.S.2d at
853.
202. See id. at 600-01, 671 N.E.2d at 1250-51, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54 (com-
menting that "a juvenile does not possess a vested liberty interest in an ACD,"
since the "vacatur of the ACD order merely brings the juvenile back to the same
circumstances he would have faced after the conclusion of fact finding"; thus con-
cluding that a juvenile merely possesses "an attenuated liberty interest in [ob-
taining] the least restrictive dispositional order under the Family Court Act").
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more stringent procedural safeguards afforded in dispositional
vacatur proceedings because even after an ACD has been re-
voked, the juvenile has yet to be adjudged a delinquent, and
thus is not yet subject to the formidable consequences that at-
tach when delinquency is established.2 3 Finding the issue
presented in the instant case more analogous to the plea agree-
ment violation hearings challenged in People v. Outley,20 4 the
Edwin majority held that
the requirements of procedural due process are satisfied when a
Family Court determines, after conducting an inquiry into the al-
legations of the violation petition, and providing the juvenile with
the opportunity to respond to those allegations, that there is a
legitimate basis for concluding that a juvenile has violated a con-
dition of an ACD order .... 205
Thus, the majority applied a "legitimate basis" test, which
merely requires that the court afford the juvenile some opportu-
nity to respond to allegations that he has breached his ACD
203. See id. at 602, 671 N.E.2d at 1251-52, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54.
204. 80 N.Y.2d 702, 610 N.E.2d 356, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1993). The Outley
case consolidated the appeals of three separate defendants. See id. at 702, 610
N.E.2d at 356, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 684. There, the defendants had agreed to enter
guilty pleas in exchange for reduced sentences. See id. The lower courts agreed to
impose the reduced sentences, but only on the condition that the defendants not be
re-arrested pending the actual sentencing. See id. at 707, 610 N.E.2d at 356, 594
N.Y.S.2d at 685. In violation of their agreements, each of the defendants was re-
arrested during the interim, and the lower courts refused to issue the reduced
sentences as conditionally agreed. See id. On appeal, the defendants did not deny
that they had breached the no-arrest conditions, but instead argued that due pro-
cess entitled them to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether they had in fact
committed the acts which led to their re-arrests. See Outley, 80 N.Y.2d 702, 610
N.E.2d 356, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683. The Court of Appeals disagreed. See id. at 712-13,
610 N.E.2d at 356, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688. The Court held that requiring an eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue of guilt would change the "not being arrested for a
crime" condition into a "not actually committing a crime" condition. See id. While
the Court found that the express language of the condition refuted the need for
such an in-depth inquiry, it did agree that due process required some sort of in-
quiry to ensure that the re-arrests were not malicious or baseless. See id. Leaving
the general nature and extent of the inquiry to the discretion of the trial court, the
Outley Court held that the inquiry must at least be sufficient to establish whether
there was a "legitimate basis" for the arrest. See id. at 713, 610 N.E.2d at 356, 594
N.Y.S.2d at 688. Where the defendants were given the opportunity to explain the
circumstances of their arrests, the Court found that sufficient process had been
afforded. See Outley, 80 N.Y.2d at 713-14, 610 N.E.2d at 356, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688-
89.
205. Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 602-03, 671 N.E.2d at 1251, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
1997]
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conditions, but otherwise leaves the form and extent of the in-
quiry to the wide discretion of the Family Court.20 6 Justifica-
tions offered for the use of the legitimate basis test included,
inter alia, preservation of the Family Court's broad discretion to
fashion appropriate remedies in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings and the desirability of avoiding "unnecessary complexity"
in the ACD process. 20 7 Balancing these state interests against
the "limited" nature of the juvenile's liberty interest in an ACD
order and the allegedly "low" risk that such liberty interest
would be erroneously deprived, 20 8 the majority concluded that
its application of the legitimate basis test satisfied the stan-
dards for determining whether a state has provided adequate
206. See id. at 603, 671 N.E.2d at 1251, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 854. The majority
expressly rejected the suggestion that due process requires an ACD revocation
hearing in every case, and moreover, explicitly permitted the Family Court to con-
sider hearsay evidence in determining whether a condition of an ACD has been
violated. See id. at 603-06, 671 N.E.2d at 1252-53, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56. How-
ever, acknowledging the fact that the defendants in Outley had conceded breach of
their "no-arrest" conditions, the majority explained that due process will require "a
more detailed inquiry" in the event a juvenile denies the predicate facts alleged in
a violation petition. See id. at 602-03, 671 N.E.2d at 1251, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
Thereafter, the majority interpreted Edwin's failure to affirmatively deny the vio-
lation allegations against him as an Outley-type admission, and consequently de-
clined to find his situation worthy of the aforementioned "more detailed inquiry."
Id.
On this issue, the dissenters found it material that the defendants in Outley
had conceded the facts, (their re-arrests), that constituted violations of their condi-
tional releases, and challenged only the process required in determining whether
they had in fact committed the underlying crimes which led to their arrests. See
Edwin L., at 609, 671 N.E.2d at 1255, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 858. On the other hand,
Edwin did not admit (or expressly deny) that he had violated any of the conditions
of his ACD, but was challenging the process afforded him in determining that pre-
cise issue. See id. Noting that Edwin was neither legally obligated to testify on his
own behalf nor carried the burden of affirmatively disproving the alleged viola-
tions, the dissent found it inappropriate to construe Edwin's silence as an admis-
sion. See id. at 608-09, 671 N.E.2d at 1254-55, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 857-58. Thus
distinguishing the facts and issue presented in Outley, the dissent deemed the ig-
noble "legitimate basis" test inapplicable to Edwin's situation. See id at 602-03,
608-09, 671 N.E.2d at 1251, 1254-55, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 854, 857-58.
207. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 603-04, 671 N.E.2d at 1251-52, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 854-55.
208. The majority found that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty
was "low" because the presentment agency would have to meet the "legitimate ba-
sis" burden, the juvenile had an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and
there was still an opportunity to defend the liberty interest at a subsequent dispo-
sitional hearing, the outcome of which was subject to judicial review. See id.
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due process protections as articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.20 9
C. Dissenting Opinion
Three justices disagreed with the aforementioned conclu-
sions in a comprehensive dissent authored by Justice Levine. 210
The dissent maintained that insofar as due process is con-
cerned, the conditional liberty interest afforded a juvenile by a
post-fact-finding ACD is "essentially identical" to that enjoyed
by probationers and parolees, and that its revocation therefore
requires comparable procedural protections. 21' Focusing on the
substantive similarities between ACD orders and dispositional
orders rather than the academic differences, the dissenters con-
cluded, in the spirit of Morrissey v. Brewer21 2 and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,21 3 that a post-fact-finding ACD does indeed embody
a significant "liberty interest," however indeterminate, as
contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. 21 4
Furthermore, the dissenters explained that notwithstand-
ing the formal adjudication of guilt, a post-fact-finding ACD is
substantially similar to the dispositions of parole and probation
in that all are based on a determination that confinement is not
currently necessary. 215 Moreover, each is designed to promote
rehabilitation by granting the individual the opportunity to re-
209. 424 U.S. 319. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 600, 603, 671 N.E.2d at 1249-
50, 1251-52, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53, 854-55. As previously discussed, Mathews v.
Eldridge requires the court to balance the private interest at stake and the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of that interest, or the value, if any, of additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards against the state interest embodied in the chal-
lenged action to determine whether such action has afforded the individual
sufficient due process. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; supra Part III.
210. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Le-
vine, J., dissenting). Before his appointment to the New York Court of Appeals,
Justice Levine previously served nine years as a New York State Family Court
Judge. See JUDICIAL YELLOW BOOK, STATE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FALL
1996.
211. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 607, 613, 671 N.E.2d at 1253, 1257, 648
N.Y.S.2d at 856, 860 (Levine, J., dissenting).
212. 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
213. 411 U.S. 778 (1973); see supra note 111.
214. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 611-15, 671 N.E.2d at 1256-59, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 859-62; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
215. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 613, 671 N.E.2d at 1257, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
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tain his liberty and to participate as a constructive member of
society, subject to possible revocation if he fails to substantially
abide by the court ordered conditions imposed upon him.216 Fi-
nally, in each case the individual justifiably relies on the prom-
ise that his conditional freedom will not be revoked unless he
fails to satisfy those conditions. 217
The dissent found unpersuasive the distinction that upon
revocation of an ACD, a formal adjudication of guilt would not
be entered, nor sanctions imposed, until the court has held a
dispositional hearing and found the juvenile in need of supervi-
sion, treatment or confinement. 218 Instead, the dissent observed
that the ACD revocation process involves precisely the same
two step inquiry as that enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Morrissey regarding parole and probation
revocation. 219 Specifically, the Family Court must first make a
factual determination as to whether an ACD condition has in
fact been violated.220 If a violation has been found, the court
must then schedule a dispositional hearing to determine
whether the juvenile requires supervision, treatment, or con-
finement.22' Recognizing that the second prong of the revoca-
tion inquiry is primarily contingent upon the conclusion
reached in the first prong of the inquiry, the dissent stressed
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 614-15, 671 N.E.2d at 1258-59, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62; see
supra Part IV.B; see generally supra note 173.
219. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 614, 671 N.E.2d at 1258, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
The Supreme Court in Morrissey recognized that revocation of the liberty interest
implicated by parole inflicts upon the parolee a "grievous loss." See Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 482. The Court explained that such a deprivation demands that a court
first determine the factual question of whether a condition of release has in fact
been violated, and if so, the court must then determine whether revocation is war-
ranted under the circumstances. See id. at 479-80. The factual determination as
to the number and nature of the violations, reached in response to the first inquiry,
is one of the circumstances to be considered in evaluating the second inquiry (that
of the propriety of revocation). See id. at 480. A similar inquiry is required prior to
probation revocation. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782, 784-85; Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d
at 609-13, 671 N.E.2d at 1255-57, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 858-60.
220. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 614, 671 N.E.2d at 1258, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 861;
supra note 219 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 219.
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the importance of reaching an accurate conclusion to the deter-
minative preliminary question. 222
Based on the analogy between the dispositional hearing
and the second prong of the Morrissey inquiry, the dissent ar-
gued that any protection offered by the dispositional hearing
was at most superficial, since the factual bases for its conclusion
had already been determined at the ACD revocation proceed-
ing.223 Thus, contrary to the majority's suggestion, the disposi-
tional hearing could not make up for the lack of procedural
protections at the prior ACD revocation hearing.224
In order to promote accurate dispositional determinations,
the dissent concluded that due process demands, at a minimum,
an "informal but effective" ACD revocation hearing.225 Particu-
larly, due process was found to require that the juvenile be af-
forded the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses against him, unless the Family Court specifically
finds good cause to dispense with such confrontation. 226 In sup-
port of its conclusion, the dissent cited the "significant" interest
of the juvenile in his conditional freedom. 227 The dissent also
cited the interests of the state in encouraging the juvenile to
lead a productive and law abiding life and in non-revocation of
an ACD based on "erroneous information or because of an erro-
neous evaluation of the need to [revoke]."228
V. Analysis: The Due Process Inquiry Applied to Edwin L.
In the instant case, Edwin complained that he had been un-
fairly treated when the Family Court revoked his conditional
freedom based on information which could not be tested for the
traditionally indispensable indicia of truthfulness, accuracy,
222. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 609-13, 671 N.E.2d at 1255-57, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 858-60.
223. See id. at 614-15, 671 N.E.2d at 1258-59, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62; see
supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
224. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 614-15, 671 N.E.2d at 1258-59, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 861-62; see supra notes 203, 208 and accompanying text.
225. See Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 614-15, 671 N.E.2d at 1258-59, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 861-62 (in part restating Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 484-85).
226. See id. at 615, 671 N.E.2d at 1259, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
227. See id. at 613-15, 671 N.E.2d at 1257-58, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61.
228. Id. (in part quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 484).
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and reliability.229 While Edwin's primary concern was likely for
his personal self preservation, the fundamentals of his case are
far reaching and will impact upon all similarly situated
juveniles. Thus, the remainder of this Note will focus on evalu-
ating the constitutional validity of the "legitimate basis" test, as
well as the merits of the arguments proffered for and against it.
In order to evaluate the constitutional validity of the proce-
dures established by Edwin L., the due process inquiry must be
applied to the post-fact-finding ACD revocation proceeding. 230
As outlined in Part III, the first step in this evaluation is to
determine whether a juvenile possesses a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in a post-fact-finding ACD.231 If so, the next step
is to assess the extent of that individual interest.232 The third
step in the process is to determine the scope of New York State's
interest in the existing ACD revocation proceeding.233 The
fourth step is to consider the likelihood that interests associated
with the ACD will be erroneously deprived under the existing
procedural scheme, and the likelihood that erroneous depriva-
tions would be avoided if additional or substitute procedural
safeguards were afforded. 234 The final step in the evaluation is
to balance the above factors against each other. 235
A. A Protected Interest in a Post-Fact-Finding ACD
As previously noted, an ACD is an order by the Family
Court which conditionally adjourns, for a specified period of
time, the delinquency proceedings pending against a juvenile.236
If the juvenile successfully abides by the court-imposed condi-
tions, the delinquency proceedings against him will be conclu-
sively dismissed.237 Thus, the juvenile who successfully fulfills
his ACD, although accused of committing a criminal act, will
never have to face the risk that a court will determine that he
has in fact committed the criminal act and is in need of supervi-
229. See supra notes 185, 189 and accompanying text.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
231. See supra notes 92-94, 98-126 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 96, 127-33 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 96, 134-47 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 96, 148-64 and accompanying text.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 165-69.
236. See supra note 11.
237. See supra note 11.
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sion, treatment, or confinement. 238 The ACD, therefore, pro-
vides the accused juvenile with the opportunity to ensure his
continued freedom, and to safeguard himself from a disposition
more restrictive than the conditions by which he is currently
bound. 239 It also provides the juvenile with the opportunity to
ensure that his record remains "clean" in respect to the alleged
offense; in other words, that he remains free from the burdens
associated with a potential predicate offense. 240
Essentially, the post-fact-finding ACD affords the juvenile
the power to maintain absolute control over his destiny. By tai-
loring his behavior to conform with the stipulated conditions,
the juvenile can completely avoid the uncertainty of a disposi-
tional hearing.
As discussed in Part III-A, the United States Supreme
Court has held that an individual's interest is constitutionally
protected whenever its abridgment would impose a "grievous
loss."241 Such interests are either derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause, or conferred by state law.242
In this case, the broadly defined interest at stake is that of a
juvenile in a post-fact-finding ACD granted by a New York
Family Court. Pertinent to this analysis, however, are the par-
ticular interests subject to infringement if the ACD is revoked.
As suggested above, these interests include the juvenile's state
conferred right to control his destiny. 243 Specifically, the juve-
nile has an interest in guaranteeing his future freedom under
the least restrictive conditions possible. 244 Similar freedom con-
cerns are also reflected in the "clean record" offered by an ACD;
in that instance, revocation may affect the restrictiveness of the
dispositions available in the event of future misconduct. 245 Fi-
nally, given the quasi-criminal nature of a juvenile delinquency
adjudication,246 the juvenile also has an interest in avoiding the
238. See supra notes 11, 171-73.
239. See supra notes 11, 171-73, 191, 202.
240. See supra notes 11, 199-201 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07; see generally supra text ac-
companying notes 98-103.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
243. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 237-40, 244 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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disfavorable reputation associated with him by those who learn
of his "delinquency" classification, since lost social, educational,
and employment opportunities could result.247
In Morrissey v. Brewer, it was held that revocation of the
conditional liberty offered by parole inflicted a "grievous loss"
upon the parolee, who justifiably relied on the promise that he
would be able to maintain control over his destiny if he upheld
his part of the bargain. 248 In Goss v. Lopez, it was held that
high school students had a state created constitutionally pro-
tected interest, not only in obtaining an education, but in avoid-
ing disparagement of their reputation, since documentation of
their misconduct, if discovered, could have an adverse affect on
their future opportunities. 249 In this case, revocation of a post-
fact-finding ACD strips the child of the right to control his
destiny. It subjects him to the uncertainty of a dispositional
hearing and increases the likelihood of a loss of freedom and a
blackened reputation. These losses are substantially analogous
to the losses suffered in the above examples. Thus, it is con-
cluded that the revocation of a court ordered ACD does inflict a
"grievous loss" upon the juvenile as contemplated by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, the inter-
ests implicated by the revocation of an ACD are constitutionally
protected. 250 Since the juvenile's interest in a post-fact-finding
ACD is constitutionally protected, adequate procedural protec-
tions must be afforded before an ACD may be revoked. 251
In the case of Edwin L., neither the majority nor the dis-
sent seriously disputed the fact that a juvenile has a constitu-
tionally protected interest in retaining his court-ordered
247. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 104-12.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 118-26.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
251. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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ACD. 252 The debate became more heated, however, when the
sides began to explore the nature and extent of that interest.253
B. Consideration of the Mathews Factors
1. The Nature of the Juvenile's Interests
As illustrated above, if two juveniles are charged with com-
mitting criminal acts and one juvenile obtains an adjournment
of the delinquency proceedings in contemplation of dismissal,
that juvenile possesses a number of constitutionally protected
interests that the other juvenile does not.25 4 According to the
majority's analysis, those interests are "limited."2 5 According
to the dissent's analysis, those interests are "significant."256 De-
spite the contingent nature of the ACD, it appears to this au-
thor that the individual interests associated with it are indeed
substantial.
Clearly, if the juvenile's ACD is revoked, all contingent ex-
pectations are immediately lost. Likewise, the juvenile has one
less opportunity to safeguard his current record, reputation,
and degree of freedom. 257 Most acute, however, is the unmiti-
gated forfeiture of control. 258 The pre-adjudicatory nature of the
ACD, unlike the dispositional orders of parole and probation,
ensures that a deprivation of freedom will not occur automati-
cally.259 However, deprivation of the juvenile's opportunity to
safeguard his record, reputation, and degree of freedom is im-
252. See supra Part IV.B-C. It is noted that the majority states in its opinion
that a juvenile who suffers an ACD revocation "does not suffer a 'grievous loss.'"
Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 602, 671 N.E.2d at 1251, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 851. However,
the author suggests that the majority was referring to its evaluation of the proper
weight to accord the juvenile's interest under the first of the Mathews factors,
rather than arguing that there was no constitutionally protected interest at all.
See generally supra Part III. This is concluded because the majority proceeded to
apply the Mathews test in assessing that a certain quantum of process was in fact
due. Had the majority's position been that no constitutionally protected interest
existed, no further analysis would have been necessary.
253. See supra Part IV.B-C.
254. See supra Part V.A.
255. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 214, 228.
257. See generally supra notes 172-73, Part IV.B-C.
258. See supra Part V.A.
259. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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mediate and complete. The juvenile arguably has a material in-
terest in avoiding such complete deprivations.
Moreover, because the granting of an ACD is discretion-
ary,260 and because courts likely would not find an unrestrictive
ACD sufficient to rehabilitate a "hardened" delinquent, it is
probable that the juvenile granted an ACD is not a persistent
offender. On the contrary, he may even be before the Family
Court for the first time. Thus, his interest in maintaining his
current status is even more heightened than it might at first
appear.
Furthermore, where the ACD has been issued after the con-
clusion of the fact-finding hearing (as in Edwin's case), it is
likely that the juvenile has an even greater interest in its con-
tinued existence, 261 because essentially, the juvenile is already
"half-way" to a delinquency adjudication. 262 In other words, if a
post-fact-finding ACD is revoked, the juvenile is not entitled to
another hearing on the issue of guilt or innocence of the under-
lying offense. His guilt has already been determined, and the
only thing standing between him and a delinquency adjudica- Q
tion is the dispositional hearing.263 Given the fact that his guilt
has already been established, it is less likely that the delin-
quency proceedings will be dismissed; and more likely that the
juvenile will be found delinquent and subjected to a liberty re-
straining dispositional order, than if the juvenile still had the
opportunity to maintain and prove his innocence. 264
Additionally, due to the interlocutory nature of the ACD
revocation order, a successful appeal at this stage in the pro-
ceedings is unlikely. 265 Thus, the deprivations discussed will
continue at least until termination of the dispositional hearing,
if not indefinitely. Given the gravity of the ultimate freedoms at
stake and the improbability of immediate appellate review, the
juvenile has a substantial interest in having the Family Court
reach an accurate conclusion on the issue of whether an ACD
violation has in fact occurred. 266 The circumstances of Edwin's
260. See supra notes 11, 22.
261. See generally supra notes 22, 172-73.
262. See generally supra notes 172-73, 202.
263. See generally supra notes 172-73, 202.
264. See generally supra notes 172-73, 202.
265. See supra note 183.
266. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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case also illustrate the significant juvenile interest in limiting
the discretion afforded to the Family Court. 267 There, both the
conditions of Edwin's ACD and the allegations supporting the
violation were somewhat ambiguous (for example, "avoid fur-
ther contact with the court" apparently meant "avoid being ar-
rested").268 Moreover, the evidence offered in support of the
allegations was primarily hearsay, and thus arguably unrelia-
ble.269 However, the broad discretion of the fact-finding judge
enabled him to conclude that sufficient proof of violations ex-
isted, and that Edwin's ACD should be revoked just two weeks
before its maturity.270
As will be discussed below, 271 the gravity of an ACD revoca-
tion may be mitigated if an unadulterated dispositional hearing
is subsequently afforded. 272 Nevertheless, it is concluded that
the individual interests associated with a post-fact-finding ACD
are indeed significant.
2. New York's Interest in Unencumbered ACD Revocation
Proceedings
Comparable in significance to the juvenile interests at
stake are the state interests embodied in the ACD process.
Foremost are New York's interests in effectively fulfilling its
parens patriae role.273 As surrogate parent, New York has a
strong interest in protecting the needs and best interests of the
accused child. 274 However, New York also has a significant
interest in protecting its citizens from the criminal acts of an
unrestrained juvenile. 275 Fortunately, the successful rehabilita-
267. See supra notes 133, 172-83 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text; see also Evan A. Davis,
New York Court of Appeals Roundup: Juvenile Justice; Lead Paint; Peremptory
Challenges, 216 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1996).
269. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text; see also Davis, supra
note 268.
270. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
271. See infra Part V.C.
272. See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see generally supra notes 173,
194-95 and accompanying text; cf Mathews, 424 U.S. at 338-40.
273. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text; see generally supra notes
37-42 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text; see generally supra notes
37-42 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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tion of a child who has ventured into a career of lawlessness
serves the best interests of both the child and the community.2 7 6
Ideally, the ACD can further that rehabilitative goal. For ex-
ample, the ACD provides the state with continuing supervisory
jurisdiction over the child who does not appear to need a very
restrictive environment, but has instead demonstrated that
only minimal guidance is necessary to steer him away from an
antisocial lifestyle.277 Given the potential value of the ACD sys-
tem, 27 New York's interest in preserving its practicability is
strong.
If, however, it appears that the juvenile's rehabilitation is
not being advanced by the permissive ACD, the state also has
an interest in an unfettered revocation process. Where the ACD
process has proven ineffective, it will further the state's inter-
ests to quickly restore the delinquency proceeding and issue a
disposition more conducive to rehabilitation. 279 Accordingly,
based on history and experience, New York has determined that
broad Family Court discretion and procedural informality best
enable the state to realize its rehabilitative goal.28 0 By ensuring
that ineffective ACD's are easily revoked, New York may also
minimize the Family Court's hesitancy to issue them.281 Since
the "legitimate basis" standard preserves the informality and
discretion of the Family Court system,28 2 New York's interest in
it is arguably strong.
However, efforts to rehabilitate will not be successful un-
less the juvenile's needs are accurately diagnosed. 28 3 In other
words, it will not serve the state's interests to revoke a child's
ACD if that child has not committed a violation warranting rev-
ocation. On the contrary, an erroneous revocation will likely de-
feat the rehabilitation process, as the juvenile will feel that he
has been cheated, or at least treated unfairly, and may there-
fore be less inclined to cooperate with the system in the fu-
276. Cf supra notes 136-38.
277. See generally supra notes 11, 42, 179.
278. See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 274-277.
279. See generally supra notes 11, 179.
280. See generally supra Part II; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT Art. Three.
281. See generally supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
282. See generally supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84, 141-42.
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ture. 28 4 Thus, the state has an interest, analogous to that of the
child, in reaching accurate factual determinations prior to re-
voking an ACD. 285
Finally, it is unquestionable that the state has a legitimate
interest in avoiding any increased administrative and financial
burdens that might be encountered if the Family Courts were
required to engage in a more formal and detailed revocation in-
quiry.28 6 Since money and manpower are limited, an increase in
the resources allotted for ACD revocation hearings would inva-
riably result in a decrease in resources available for other public
services. 28 7 Accordingly, it is concluded that New York's inter-
est in an unencumbered ACD revocation process, comparable to
that of the juvenile in maintaining his ACD, is significant.
3. The Likelihood that an ACD will be Erroneously
Revoked Under the Existing Procedural Scheme,
and the Capacity to Avoid Any Erroneous
Revocations
Under the newly established Edwin L. rule, when a juve-
nile is accused of violating a condition of his post-fact-finding
ACD order, the Family Court is required to "conduct an inquiry"
into the alleged violation. 288 The Family Court must also pro-
vide the juvenile with an "opportunity to respond" to the allega-
tions against him. 28 9 However, the New York Court of Appeals
majority expressly held that an actual revocation hearing "is
not required in every case."290 On the contrary, the majority
held that "[tihe form and extent of the inquiry necessary ...
will vary according to the particular circumstances of each case,
and ultimately lie within the discretion of the Family Court."291
In fact, reliance on hearsay evidence in making the revocation
284. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 141-42.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84, 141-42.
286. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 205.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 205.
290. See supra note 205; Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 605, 671 N.E.2d at 1253, 648
N.Y.S.2d at 856.
291. Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d at 603, 671 N.E.2d at 1251, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 854; see
supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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decision is expressly permitted. 292 According to Edwin L., an
ACD revocation inquiry satisfies Fourteenth Amendment prin-
ciples of due process as long as the Family Court asserts a "le-
gitimate basis" for concluding that a violation has actually
occurred. 293
As previously discussed, the degree of procedural safe-
guards provided will influence the accuracy and error inherent
in the truthfinding process. 294 Relevant to this case, such safe-
guards include a heightened standard of proof and the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. 295 The United States
Supreme Court has confirmed that a heightened standard of
proof is particularly effective in reducing the risk that a consti-
tutionally protected interest will be erroneously deprived.296 To
illustrate: the higher the standard of proof, the greater the evi-
dence needed to support a conclusion, and the less likely it is
that the fact-finder will erroneously deprive the individual of a
protected right. On the other hand, the lower the evidentiary
standard, the more likely that an innocent individual will be
wrongfully deprived. While the lower burden is clearly a cause
for individual concern, the higher burden, in contrast, arguably
promotes both state and individual interests. Both interests
are advanced because the state and the juvenile have similarly
strong interests in accuracy, and neither would benefit if re-
sources are spent on juveniles who do not actually need
rehabilitation. 297
The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses has
proven similarly valuable in reducing the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation inherent in a particular factual determination.298
When a fact-finder is called upon to determine the truth of alle-
gations charged by one person against another, the credibility of
the accuser is generally a critical issue. However, hearsay evi-
dence denies the accused the opportunity to test the declarant's
292. See supra note 206.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 205.
294. See supra note 185; Part III.B(3).
295. See, e.g., supra note 185; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764-65
(1982).
296. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764-65.
297. See supra Part V.B(1-2).
298. See supra note 185.
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capacity as a witness, and to observe his revealing demeanor. 299
Moreover, the damning statements are generally not made
under circumstances which impress the speaker with the grav-
ity of his statements. 300 For this reason, consideration of hear-
say evidence during fact-finding proceedings has generally been
disfavored.301 Correspondingly, the opportunity of the accused
to confront and cross-examine his accuser has long been recog-
nized as an invaluable tool in ascertaining the truth.30 2
In this case, the majority has concluded that a "legitimate
basis" standard sufficiently protects the juvenile from an erro-
neous ACD revocation.30 3 However, the "legitimate basis" stan-
dard is one of the most deferential known to our judicial
system.304 Furthermore, the lower courts have been explicitly
authorized to consider hearsay evidence in determining
whether a child's ACD should be revoked.30 5 As noted above,
hearsay evidence is inherently unreliable.30 6 Moreover, the
broad discretion afforded the Family Courts increases the likeli-
hood that revocation decisions will be arbitrary or based on im-
proper criteria, such as the judge's subjective belief that the
juvenile is a "troublemaker."30 7 This risk is further intensified
due to the pervasive lack of appellate review. 308
Finally, the resource allocation under the existing scheme
may increase the risk of an unwarranted ACD revocation. The
juvenile probation department is often responsible for investi-
gating the juvenile's behavior and reporting its recommenda-
tions to the Family Court.309 Both the probation department
and the presentment agency are agents of the state, and pre-
299. See supra note 185.
300. See supra note 185.
301. See supra note 185.
302. See supra note 185.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
304. The legitimate basis standard is clearly less imposing than the familiar
standards of preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; possibly only posing a greater obstacle than the
"some credible evidence" standard. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-25
(1979); Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1003-004 (2d Cir. 1994).
305. See supra note 206.
306. See supra notes 185, 298-302 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 133, 156 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 131-32, 183, 265-66 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 157 and accompanying text; see generally supra note 174.
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sumably have vast pools of resources and expertise at their dis-
posal. The juvenile, on the other hand, is often represented, if it
all, by a court-appointed attorney functioning as a law guard-
ian. Thus, despite the juvenile's guaranteed "opportunity to be
heard," the juvenile suffers a great handicap in defending
against allegations that a "legitimate basis" exists for revoca-
tion of an ACD.
On the other hand, the risk that an ACD will be errone-
ously revoked can easily be abated. Our judicial system pro-
vides a wealth of procedures designed to protect against the risk
of error inherent in the fact-finding process. 310 Since the Family
Court is already required to "conduct an inquiry" prior to re-
voking an ACD, it is already considering evidence on the facts
alleged in the violation petitions. 311 It would impose minimal, if
any, additional burden to bar the presentation of hearsay testi-
mony unless good cause is shown as to why the accusing wit-
ness can not be present. The effects of subjecting the evidence
adduced to a more stringent standard of proof would be simi-
larly negligible. 312 Moreover, none of the aforementioned state
interests would suffer if heightened procedural requirements
were imposed, and in fact, the mutual interest in accuracy
would be promoted. 313
Based on the above assertions, it is concluded that the pro-
cedures endorsed by the Edwin L. majority produce an ex-
tremely high risk of error, which is unnecessarily shouldered
almost entirely by the juvenile. The majority suggested that
the risk of error produced by the relatively procedure-free ACD
revocation proceeding was mitigated by the fact that a subse-
quent dispositional hearing would be held before the juvenile
would be deprived of his freedom.31 4 As illustrated below, 315
this argument is unsound.
310. See, e.g., supra notes 159-62, 185 and accompanying text; Part III.B(3).
311. See supra notes 17, 205, 289 and accompanying text.
312. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
313. See supra Part V.B(2); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 636 n.22 (1979).
314. See supra notes 191-94, 202, 208 and accompanying text.
315. See infra Part V.C.
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C. Balancing the Mathews Factors: The Process Required
The final inquiry addresses whether the procedural safe-
guards afforded are adequate under the circumstances. 316
Before an individual may be subjected to a final deprivation of a
protected interest, some form of inquiry must be afforded.317 In
fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that it is "a principle
basic to our society" that due process be accorded before an indi-
vidual may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind,
even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a
criminal conviction."318 This fundamental requirement is satis-
fied by affording the individual an opportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."319 As noted
above, the nature and extent of the requisite procedural hearing
is determined by balancing the various interests at stake.
320
Given the juvenile's constitutionally protected interest in a
post-fact-finding ACD, 321 the question presented at this point is
whether, in light of the interests discussed above, 322 an ACD
revocation proceeding which includes the consideration of hear-
say testimony (without first finding good cause to dispense with
the confrontation of witnesses) provides the juvenile with a
"meaningful" opportunity to respond to the violation allegations
against him.323
With regard to the ACD process, the interests of the juve-
nile and the state are comparable in significance. 324 However, a
balance must be struck which respects the weighty concerns of
the juvenile and the significant interest of the state in infor-
mality, while at the same time comporting with the dictates of
constitutional due process.325 Thus, in balancing the Mathews
factors, the risk inherent in the procedures endorsed by the Ed-
316. See supra notes 85-97; Part III.C.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 205, 288; Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
318. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
319. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
320. See supra notes 85-97; Parts III.C, V.B(1-2).
321. See supra Part V.A.
322. See supra Part V.B(1-3).
323. See supra notes 189, 288-93, 318 and accompanying text; see supra text
accompanying notes 205-06.
324. See supra Part V.B(1-2).
325. See supra notes 85-97; Parts III.C, V.B(1-2).
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win L. majority becomes the determinative factor in assessing
their constitutional sufficiency. 326
As previously noted, the existing procedures produce an ex-
tremely high risk of an erroneous deprivation. 327 Furthermore,
that risk is unnecessary, since instituting additional procedural
safeguards would be both feasible and effective. 328 Moreover,
the risk is cast almost entirely upon the juvenile, arguably the
party who has the most to lose and the least resources with
which to defend himself. Additionally, despite the majority con-
tention, in practice the dispositional hearing does not effectively
safeguard against the risk of erroneous deprivations. 329 On the
contrary, by the time of the dispositional hearing, the juvenile
has already lost all contingent interests in the ACD, and even
more critically, the juvenile has lost his right to control his
destiny. 330
Even if the scope of juvenile interests implicated by the rev-
ocation of a post-fact-finding ACD was limited to that of physi-
cal freedom, the value of the dispositional hearing in
safeguarding the juvenile from an unwarranted loss of freedom
would still not be what the majority purports it to be. In fact,
after guilt has been established at the fact-finding hearing, and
violations have been established at the ACD revocation inquiry,
the dispositional hearing is really quite an illusory shield. In
determining whether the juvenile requires "supervision, treat-
ment or confinement," the Family Court inevitably considers
the facts that the child has previously been found guilty of an
underlying criminal act, and that he has been found in direct
violation of the court's ACD order. 331 Thus, the juvenile who
has suffered an ACD revocation does not come to the disposi-
tional hearing with a clean slate. Instead, he is already
marked, (by his "established" failure to abide by the conditions
of his ACD), as an unwilling or incapable candidate for the more
lenient rehabilitative methods. If the conclusions reached at
the ACD revocation hearing are inaccurate and unreliable, it
326. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; Part V.B(3).
327. See supra Part V.B(3).
328. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
329. See generally supra text accompanying notes 191-95, 202, 208, 272, 313;
Part V.B(3).
330. See supra Parts V.A, V.B(1).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
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logically follows that the conclusions reached at the disposi-
tional hearing will also be inaccurate and unreliable. Clearly,
the subsequent dispositional hearing cannot make up for the
lack of procedural protections during the ACD revocation pro-
cess. For this reason, it is imperative that the reliability of the
ACD decision be insured through the use of additional proce-
dural protections, which are specifically designed to reduce the
risk of error in the truthfinding process.
In addition, the purported benefits of informality in the
Family Court system do not cure the constitutional deficiencies
in the Edwin L. rule. As previously recognized, informality pro-
motes inaccuracy. 332 It can hardly be claimed that an unwar-
ranted decision to revoke a child's constitutionally protected
interest in an ACD is socially desirable. On the contrary, it
serves no legitimate interests. Instead, an erroneous revocation
wastes valuable public resources, offends the integrity of the ju-
dicial system, and defeats the rehabilitative goal.
The majority analysis relies on the contingent characteriza-
tion of the juvenile interests and the purported safeguard of the
dispositional hearing to conclude that only minimal procedural
protections are required prior to an ACD revocation.33 3 As illus-
trated above, however, this reasoning is misguided. As a result,
the majority has dictated a rule that creates an undue risk of
erroneous deprivations. This risk is unjustifiable and unconsti-
tutional. To comport with Fourteenth Amendment principles of
procedural due process, it is concluded that, if only a "legitimate
basis" for a revocation is required, the juvenile is at least enti-
tled to a hearing at which hearsay evidence will be excluded,
unless the court first finds good cause to dispense with the con-
frontation of witnesses.
VI. Conclusion
In Edwin L., an individual complained that he had been
unfairly treated by an agent of the State of New York. Recal-
ling that his forefathers had drafted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution to shield against such transgressions,
the individual sought to invoke its protections. He petitioned
332. See supra Parts II.A, III.B(3), V.B(3).
333. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
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the highest court of his state, challenging the constitutionality
of the manner in which he had been treated. However, because
he had not yet reached the age of majority, he was apparently
treated with "kid" gloves. Despite the fervent dissent of a vet-
eran Family Court judge, the child's appeal received only lofty
rationalizations, reminiscent of the pre-Gault days, and an ad-
visement to seek comfort in an illusory dispositional hearing.
He was not the only one dismayed to discover that a majority of
the New York Court of Appeals felt that the transgression he
had suffered was not serious enough to warrant protections
greater than the most deferential "legitimate basis" standard.
This author finds solace, however, in the realization that
the Edwin L. rule, as with other constitutional guarantees, is
just a starting point. It is the bare minimum that must be af-
forded, and in no way replaces the seasoned wisdom and insight
of the Family Court judges who have the opportunity to observe
first-hand the realities of the ACD process. Given the particu-
larly vulnerable nature of the juvenile granted a conditional
ACD, this author feels that it is especially important to ensure
that deprivations are based only on fair and accurate factual
conclusions. Thus, it is hoped that the Family Courts will elect,
in their confirmed discretion, to afford the heightened proce-
dural protections which history has proven to be indispensable
in avoiding erroneous deprivations of constitutionally protected
interests.
Debra Bloomer
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